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WELFARE RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS: A STUDY IN
DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
Qualifying for the receipt of welfare assistance is based upon one's
need and the satisfaction of certain eligibility standards. One such stand-
ard is the residence requirement. State welfare residence requirements
are statutory provisions which require a stipulated period of residency as a
prerequisite to the receipt of welfare assistance. Until recently, these re-
quirements were applied to five basic types of relief: old age assistance, aid
to dependent children, aid to the blind, aid to the disabled, and general
assistance or aid to the poor.1
The modern statutory residence requirement devolves historically from
the settlement concept embodied in the Elizabethan Poor Laws.2 Accord-
ing to this concept, each community had exclusive responsibility for the
care of its own poor. Thus a distinction between local and foreign indi-
gents developed. The long-term local indigent was granted community
support, whereas the foreign indigent was either deterred from entering
the community or else forced to return to his place of settlement.3 Conse-
quently, many indigent persons were coerced into remaining in a place in
which they had no future, their free movement and personal opportunity
having been greatly restricted.4
To an extent the Social Security Act of 1935 permitted the continu-
ance of this practice. The federal act provided in part for federal subsidi-
zation of state aid programs for dependent children, the aged, blind, and
disabledY "To be eligible for federal grants the individual states were re-
quired to submit acceptable plans for the administration of these funds."
No plan would be approved unless it contained residence requirements be-
low those which "Congress viewed as an acceptable maximum." 7  These
'Note, Residence Requirements in State Public Welfare Statutes, 51 IowA L. REv. 1080
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Note, Residence Requirements].
2 The Poor Relief Act of 1601, 43 Eliz. 1, c.2.
[T]he Elizabethan Poor Law was both a consolidation of earlier Tudor Statutes and a
consummation of English experience with care of the poor. A growth rather than a
creation, it contained almost nothing new but fixed the character of poor relief for
three centuries not only in England but in America as well. Today its principal fea-
tures linger in the welfare programs of all our states. TenBroek, California's Dual Sys.
tern of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present Status, 16 STAN. L REV.
257, 258 (1964).
"A supplemental 'Act of Settlement' (14 Car. 2, c.12 (1662)) passed in 1662 added a residence
requirement (to the Poor Relief Act of 1601) .. " Note, Welfare Benefits-A Constitutional
Right to Change Residence, 7 J. FmaLY LAw 660, 661 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Welfare Benefits].
3 Mandelker, The Settlement Requirement in General Assistance, 1955 WAsH. U. L. Q. 355,
356-58.
4 Note, Residence Requirements, supra note 1, at 1801.
5Id.
6Id.
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 646 (1969).
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maximum requirements were included within the provisions of the Social
Security Act. For example, section 402 (b) of the act, which set forth the
requirements for the aid to dependent children program, authorized the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to approve only those state
assistance programs which set residence requirements at one year or less.8
The effect of this section was to require "41 States to repeal or drastically
revise offending statutes .... 9" if they were to qualify for federal funding.
There has been much recent debate concerning the reasons for Congress
allowing the continuation of the residence requirement in the state-federal
aid programs. The main issue has been whether or not Congress actually
intended to authorize the states to impose residence requirements."0  "Both
those favoring lengthy residence requirements and those opposing all re-
quirements pleaded their case during the congressional hearings on the
Social Security Act."11 The history of the act "discloses that Congress en-
acted the [provision3 to curb hardships resulting from lengthy residence
requirements. ' 12  For example, "[b~oth the House and Senate Committee
Reports expressly stated that the objective of § 402 (b) [involving AFDC
assistancel was to force [lliberality of residence requirements.' "13 Argu-
ably, the continuation of residence requirements may have been allowed
merely as a compromise in the hope that the states could, in the future, be
encouraged to voluntarily relax or eliminate their residence requirements.14
Between 1935 and 1969, reductions in residence requirements, primarily
in the programs involving old age assistance, were made.1 5 Few states,
however, voluntarily eliminated their residence requirements.' The resi-
dence requirement remained a primary means of conditioning the receipt
of welfare assistance. In 1969, most states still had statutes requiring a
stipulated period of residency as a prerequisite for receipt of welfare bene-
fits.17
Shapiro V. Thompson,8 however, reversed this established practice by
declaring such residence requirements unconstitutional. In 1966-1967 the
constitutionality of the residence requirement was tested when rejected
AFDC (Aid to Families With Dependent Children) applicants brought
8 Note, Welfare Benefits, supra note 2, at 661 & n.8.
9 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 640 (1969).
10See Smith v. Reynolds, 277 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1967); Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F.
Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967); Green v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 270 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del.
1967); Harrell v. Tobriner, 279 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1967).
"1 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 646 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
12 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 639 (1969).
13 Id. at 640.
14 Note, Residence Requirements, supra note 1, at 1081-82.
15Id. at 1082 & nn.15 & 17.
16 Id. at n. 17.
ITSee, id. at 1091-95. The appendix sets out the residence requirement for each aid pro-
gram for each state.
18 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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declaratory judgment actions in the federal District Courts of Connecti-
cut,1" the District of Columbia,20 and Pennsylvania.21 These applicants
sought a declaration that state statutes imposing a one-year residence re-
quirement were unconstitutional. Benefits had been denied to the appel-
lees solely on the ground that they failed to meet the one-year residence
requirement. The District Courts, in each case, held the statutory provi-
sions unconstitutional.2 2 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court
consolidated these cases in order to base its decision on the broadest pos-
sible spectrum of available issue.
The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court decisions on the
grounds that the statutes in question violated the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment and the due process clause of the fifth
amendment, - stating that only a "compelling state interest" could provide
sufficient justification for the infringement of the applicant's constitu-
tional right to travel.2'
The states relied on the presumption of constitutionality normally at-
tributed to police power regulation in order to justify the use of the wait-
ing period requirement, and the resultant classification.25 State legisla-
tures are generally vested with a wide range of "discretion in determining
what measures are necessary to promote the public welfare."2" Because
of the normal presumption attending such legislation, a "classification
(by the legislature] need not be accurate, scientific, logical or harmonious,
so long as it is not arbitrary and will accomplish the legislative design."2' 7
The states contended that the qualification in question "is a reasonable
one directly related to the problem sought to be governed .... [and, as
such, is within the state's] discretion and authority to enact."2
19 Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967).
20 HarreU v. Tobriner, 279 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1967).
21 Smith v. Reynolds, 277 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
22See cases cited in notes 21-23 supra. See generally 37 U. ON. L REv. 207 (1968); 42
CONN. B. J. 114 (1968); 29 U. PriT. L 1REv. 138 (1967); 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 570 (1968).
23 The fact that the District of Columbia statute was adopted by Congress poses constitutional
problems of a somewhat different nature than those involved in determining the constitutional-
ity of a state statutory provision. The principal dispute between the majority and the dissent
concerned the extent to which federal power could be exercised in enacting a minimal residence
requirement.
24 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 641-42 (1969).
-T5he effect of the waiting period requirement is
to create two classes of needy resident families indistinquishable from each other ex-
cept that one is composed of residents who have resided a year or more, and the second
of residents who have resided less than a year, in the jurisdiction. On the basis of
this sole difference the first class is granted and the second class is denied welfare aid
upon which may depend the ability of the families to obtain the very means to sub-
sist-food, shelter and other necessities of life.
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969).
26 People ex rel. Heydenreich v. Lyons, 374 111. 557, 562, 30 N.E.2d 46, 50 (1940).
271d. at 564, 30 N.E.2d at 51.
28 Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331, 338 (D. Conn. 1967) (dissenting opinion).
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Through the use of the one-year residence requirement the states al-
leged they could protect "the fiscal integrity of state public assistance pro-
grams. '29  The states feared that the elimination of the requirement would
result in a heavy influx of individuals into the state providing the most
generous benefits, thereby putting great stress on the state's welfare bud-
get. To reduce expenditures, or to prevent any reduction in aid to long-
term residents, the states erected the one-year residence requirement bar-
rier to prevent the influx of such indigents. The states contended that
the residence tests, in addition to being a reasonable and permissible
means of accomplishing this objective, also served certain administrative
and related governmental objectives, such as preventing fraud, facilitat-
ing budget planning and providing an objective test for residence. 0
The Supreme Court summarily dismissed the above contention on the
grounds that such requirements violate an individual's right to interstate
movement, and his right to equal protection."' The premise of the first
finding is that the constitutional right to travel exists. The right of inter-
state travel has long been recognized by the courts as a basic right under
the Constitution.3 2  Although its exact source has remained unclear, it
has been implied from the commerce clause, the privileges and im-
munities clause of the fourteenth amendment, and the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. The landmark case recognizing the ex-
istence of a right to travel is Edwards v. California.4 More recent cases
have not only affirmed the existence of the right of interstate movement
and its concomitant right to establish residence, but have further expanded
this right through the recognition of a right to be free from infringement
upon that right.35 The right to travel not only prohibits the deterrence of
in-migration by indigents but, more importantly, it prohibits any state ac-
tion which has the effect of penalizing an individual for exercising con-
stitutionally protected rights.3 6 Indigents moving to a new state may do so
for a variety of reasons. If the constitutional right of travel of these per-
sons is to be fully protected, the purpose for entering must necessarily be
29 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969).
SOd. at 633-38.
3 1 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, (1969).
82 "The constitutional right to travel from one state to another... occupies a position funda-
mental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that has been firmly established and re-
peatedly recognized." United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966) (quoted with ap-
proval in Shapiro v. Thompson 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1960)).
33 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 & n.8 (1969).
34 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
35 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Aptheker v. Rusk, 378 U.S. 500 (1964);
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958). But see, Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
36 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570,
581 (1968).
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irrelevant. To hold otherwise would be to subvert the mandates of the
Constitution.3 7
The court's second finding was that the one-year residence requirement
established a classification which violated the equal protection clause of
fourteenth amendment. The lower courts in addressing themselves to
this question held that the waiting period requirement violated equal pro-
tection "because even if its purpose were valid, which it is not, the
classifications are unreasonable." 38  No lower court had suggested, how-
ever, that a stricter test than that of reasonableness be applied in such cases.
The courts in Thompson v. Shapiro3 9 and Green v. Department of Public
Welfare,4" for example, expressly stated that "the classifications are not
drawn on the presumptively suspect lines of race or color ' 4 1 which would
reverse the normal presumption of constitutionality." 42  The Supreme
Court in Shapiro v. Thompson,4 3 however, held that "statutory classifica-
tions which either are based upon certain 'suspect' criteria or affect 'funda-
mental rights' will be held to deny equal protection unless justified by a
'compelling' governmental interest. ' 44  Thus, the Court expanded the list
of inherently suspect classifications (formerly race, wealth, and political
alliance) "to include [a classification] based upon recent interstate move-
ments .. .
The result of the Court's decision is to recognize, at least by implica-
tion, a fundamental national right to receive continuous welfare benefits
sufficient to provide families with "the very means to subsist-food,
shelter, and other necessities of life. '46 In this light, this case can best be
analyzed as an attempt by the court to add to the growing law of sub-
stantive equal protection. The basic principles of this doctrine are that:
"There are some 'classifications' that are far from irrational, but are none-
theless unconstitutional because they produce inequalities that are unac-
ceptable in this generation's idealization of America. ' '47  The Court's
37 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631-32 (1969).
38E.g., Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331, 337-38 (D. Conn. 1967). The district
courts were applying the traditional test under which equal protection is denied only if the class-
ification established is not reasonable in light of the intended purpose of the statute.
39 270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967).
40 270 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1967).
41 Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331, 337 (D. Conn. 1967); Green v. Department of
Pub. Welfare, 270 F. Supp. 173, 176 (D. Del. 1967).
42 The classification "does not appear to be inherently 'suspect' in a constitutional sense, in
contrast to certain classifications such as those based on race. Thus plaintiffs must shoulder the
burden of showing that the classification based on residence does not have any reasonable justi-
fication." Green v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 270 F. Supp. 173, 176 (D. Del. 1967).
43 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
4I1d. at 658 (dissenting opinion).
45 Id. at 658-59 (dissenting opinion).
46See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
47 Karst & Horowitz, Reitman v. M!ulkey: A Telaophase of Substantive Equal Protection,
1967 SUP. CT. REV. 39, 57-58 [hereinafter cited as Karst & Horowitz].
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decisions in this area appear to be primarily concerned with the attainment
of this goal-the elimination of such inequities in our society. Because
of the nature of these decisions, the explanations set forth in these cases
are at times criticized for not providing sufficient guidance for later liti-
gation.48  There are, however, certain bases which are discernible in the
Court's decisions in this area. An analysis of the rationale set forth in
several pertinent cases will demonstrate the approaches utilized by the
Court in giving effect to the principles of substantive equal protection.
"[T~he Court will [sometimes] state that a classification, even though
rational, bears a heavier burden of justification than mere rationality."49
In Loving v. Virginia,50 for example, the court held unconstitutional
Virginia's miscegenation statute as violative of equal protection and due
process. In that case the state's statute was arguably rational in light of
its purpose " 'to preserve the racial integrity of its citizens'. . . .," The
Court, however, held that "the Equal Protection clause demands that racial
classifications . . be subjected to the 'most rigid scrutiny' ....,.."o Mere
rationality was held to be an insufficient justification for a statutory classi-
fication based solely upon race.
The Court may also hold "that the classification is impermissible, with-
out any analysis of the degree of rationality or degree of justification.153
Illustrative of this is Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,"4 in which the
Virginia poll tax was declared unconstitutional. The Court held that "a
state violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an
electorial standard."'5 This conclusion was reached without attempting to
determine whether there was any rational state policy which justified the
imposition of the tax.
The Court may also "apply the principle of the 'least onerous alterna-
tive' and hold a rational classification to be impermissible because .... "
less harsh means are available55 The Court in Carrington v. Rash"T rec-
ognized as rational the argument used to justify its statute prohibiting any
serviceman from acquiring a new voting residence so long as he remains
4 8 Kurland, The Supreme Court 1963 Term-Forward: Equal in Origin and Equal in Title
to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government, 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 169-70
(1964); Henkin, The Supreme Court 1967 Term-Forward: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L.
REv. 63, 64 (1968).
49 Karst & Horowitz, supra note 47, at 58 & n.54.
50 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
51 See Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 89-90, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 judgment vacated and remanded
350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per curiam) [vacated because of an insufficient record].
52 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1966).
53 Karst & Horowitz, supra note 47, at 58 & n.55.
54 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
55 Id. at 666.
56 Karst & Horowitz, supra note 47, at 58 & n.56.
57380 U.S. 89 (1965).
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in service.r The Court held, however, that the objectives sought could be
achieved by the development of more precise tests for "determining
whether servicemen have actually acquired a new domicile in a State for
franchise purposes."59 Since the state had reasonable alternatives available
to it which infringed less upon protected interests, it was required to utilize
these means.
The Court in the present case seems to have utilized all the above ap-
proaches in arriving at its decision. The Court, for example, conceded
that "the one-year waiting-period device [was) well suited to discourage
the influx of poor families in need of assistance," 60 but concluded, without
any further inquiry as to the necessity of such a requirement, that such a
purpose was "constitutionally impermissible. ' 16' The court also held that
"any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right [the
right to travel], unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling
governmental interest [and regardless of its rationality] is unconstitu-
tional." 2 Similarly, the Court concluded that "there [was] no need for a
State to use the one-year waiting period as a safeguard against fraudulent
receipt of benefits; for less drastic means are available, and are employed,
to minimize that hazard."63
The specific types of cases decided under this doctrine have involved,
for the most part, those sectors of our population most alienated from our
political processes. The Court has identified certain fundamental inter-
ests that are vital to the development of these sectors of society, and have
imposed equality in these areas in the name of the Constitution.64 The
influence of this equalitarianism is well exemplified by decisions concern-
ing the administration of criminal justice. In Griffin v. Illinois,65 Douglas
v. California,6 and Anders v. California,67 the Court focused on "in-
equities between rich and poor defendants that resulted from [criminal]
... procedures," 6 and held that equal protection forbids invidious discrim-
ination against indigents." The Court thus attempted to assure every per-
son, regardless of his economic status, equal rights under criminal proce-
581d. at 91-94.
19 Id. at 96.
60 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969).
6lId. at 629, 631.
621d. at 634.
631d. at 637.
64 Karst & Horowitz, supra note 47, at 58.
65351 U.S. 12 (1956).
66 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
67 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
08 Karst & Horowitz, supra note 47, at 60.
6 9 An example of the type of language used in these decisions appears in Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956). In that case the court held that "there can be no equal justice where
the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has."
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dure. Cases involving the franchise, racial discrimination, and state re-
sponsibility for discrimination have also been decided by this method of
judicial inquiry."
The cases suggest that neutral statutory treatment may not be enough,
but that affirmative governmental action may be required if necessary to
prevent discrimination in these vital areas. "[E~mphasis is [being placed]
upon measures the states must adopt in carrying on their activities and
steps they must take to offset disabilities not of their creation. ''7 1 The ac-
tivity of the Court may best be summarized as follows:
[Jludicial activism feeds on itself. The public has come to expect the
Court to intervene against gross abuses. And so the Court must inter-
vene. . . . Given that fact, we shall be lucky to get good explanations
in substantive equal protection cases.72
The recognition of the right to receive welfare assistance, and the
obvious importance of such funds to the individual recipient, raises some
significant questions about the extent and type of regulation that govern-
ment can place upon the receipt of such aid. Historically, welfare bene-
fits were thought to be a gratuity, rather than a right of citizenship,73 and
as such, were subject to qualifications imposed by the state. Additionally,
welfare agencies were given the power to regulate the use of funds after
they were distributed. Thus, besides conditioning eligibility on need and
the satisfaction of a residence requirement, government, via the welfare
agency, is able to impose administrative regulations which effect the con-
tinued enjoyment of benefits once received.
Certainly some form of control is necessary and its imposition proper.
Few "will deny that fair and reasonable eligibility standards and effective
protection against fraud are necessary when benefits are handed out." 4
However, these standards and conditions can not be used to coerce the
recipient into relinquishing his constitutional rights. The issue then be-
comes the extent to which these conditions and standards can infringe upon
the recipient's constitutional rights. This necessitates a balancing of the
interests of the state against those of the recipient.
In distributing welfare funds, the government should not be allowed
to impose any conditions that would be unconstitutional if imposed upon
persons not on welfare. Government can not buy-up constitutional rights.75
70 Karst & Horowitz, supra note 47, at 59-78.
71 Cox, The Supreme Court 1965 Term-Forward: Constitutional Adjudication and the
Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 93 (1966).
7 2 Karst & Horowitz, supra note 47, at 79.
73 Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE LJ.
1245 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Reich, Individual Rights]; See generally, O'Neil, Unconstitu-
tional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings Attached, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 443, 444-46
(1966).
74 Reich, Individual Rights, supra note 73, at 1245.
75 Handler, Controlling Official Behavior in Welfare Administration, 54 CALIF. L REV.
478, 482 (1966). See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L REV. 732, 782-83, 1252 (1964).
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One way to prevent such "purchases" is to require certain basic procedural
safeguards in the administration of assistance programs. "The Social Se-
curity Act has long required 'opportunity for a fair hearing' both in the
denial of applications and in the termination of benefits. 78  In practice,
however, the act has not afforded the recipient sufficient protection from
arbitrary administrative practices and procedures which deprive a recipient
of his substantive and constitutional rights, and most importantly, his
dignity as a human being.77
The local welfare agency is given a wide range of discretion in the ad-
ministration of its local programs. In fact, the administrators possess the
ultimate means of control over the recipient. By threatening, either ex-
pressly or impliedly, to discontinue public assistance, the agency official is
able to force compliance with almost any condition which he may deem
necessary. The recipient is often subject to the whim and caprice of the
administrator. One has little choice but to submit to all conditions im-
posed, since to do otherwise would result in the loss of benefits necessary
for survival.
Some welfare regulations are merely attempts to impose a standard of
moral behavior on beneficiaries. 78 The agency may use its power to grant
or deny funds as a tool to curtail what officials may consider an illicit re-
lationship. For example, mothers receiving AFDC benefits may be threat-
ened with the immediate suspension of benefits or with neglect proceedings
if "while receiving assistance . . . [they] give birth to an illegitimate
child ...-7 or if found "living with a man capable of rendering financial
support.. ." notwithstanding the amount of support actually received
from said paramour. Most of these practices have been found invalid and
improper, either by the courts or by the Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare, but the fact remains that for many years such tactics were com-
mon practice. It is imperative that recipients be legally protected from
such unreasonable administrative practices since they are, for the most
part, unable to sufficiently protect themselves.
A recent case attacking one form of arbitrary administrative regulation
is King v. Smith."' The case held Alabama's "substituted father" regula-
7 6 Pye & Cochran, Legal Aid-A Proposal, 47 N.C.L REV. 528, 560 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Pye & Cochran].
77 The act's opportunity for a fair hearing "has not meant the right to know before a re-
quested post-termination hearing exactly what rules and evidence the department relied upon;
it has not meant notice of the exact issues considered relevant; it has not meant a right to coun-
sel at the hearing; it has not meant that the recipient had a right to confront and examine wit-
nesses; and it has not meant the right to access to department records that affect the cases."
Id. at 560-61.
78 Reich, Individual Rights, supra note 73, at 1247.
79 Id.
sold.
81 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
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tion invalid "because it defines parent in a manner that is inconsistent
with section 406 (a) of the Social Security Act."'
The Supreme Court... found the term 'parent' as used in the act meant an
individual who was under a state recognized duty of support and that...
'destitute children who are legally fatherless cannot be flatly denied federal
funded assistance on the transparent fiction that they have a substituted
father.' 83
The effect of the holding was to prohibit the states from terminating bene-
fits solely on the unjustified presumption of contribution, without regard
to actual contribution, or legal responsibility for the support of the chil-
dren. The decision thus represents a further recognition of the importance
of safeguarding the eligible individual's interest in public assistance.
Important legal questions also arise in regard to the investigatory meth-
ods used by welfare officials for determining an individual's eligibility
and extent of need. One "common practice [is) for authorities to make
unannounced inspections of the homes of persons receiving public assist-
ance." While regularly scheduled housecalls may be reasonable, in the
extreme, such action inevitably raises the question of invasion of privacy.
One striking example is the "practice of conducting 'midnight raids' on
homes receiving aid to dependent children, to see if there is a 'man in the
house'. . . ."' "The demand for entry [often carries) with it the threat,
express or implied, that refusal to admit [would] lead to discontinuance
of public assistance."86 Searches of this nature "without warrants [are]
. . . unreasonable and therefore illegal and unconstitutional." '  Such un-
due interference with the private lives of welfare beneficiaries should not
be tolerated. The above are only a sampling of the relevant issues. There
are many other conditions imposed which, while appearing less obvious
or blatant than the above, may still infringe upon a recipient's rights and
freedom.88
The denial of benefits, without sufficient procedural safeguards, seems
diametrically opposed to the concept of assistance as a basic right. "At a
minimum, there should be notice to beneficiaries of regulations and pro-
posed adverse action, and fact finding should be carried on in a scrupulous
fashion."89 Beyond this minimum, however, it is vital that effective pre-
82 Id.; Note 15 How. LJ. 265, 269 & n.16 (1969).
83 Pye & Cochran, supra note 76, at 564.
84 Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social Security Act, 72 YALE LJ. 1347 (1963)
thereinafter cited as Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches].
85 Reich, Individual Rights, sapra note 73, at 1248.
8 6 Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches, supra note 84, at 1347.
87 Id. at 1355.
88 For other conditions imposed upon the recipient, see Pye & Cochran, supra note 76, at 562-
56.
89 Reich, Individual Rights, supra note 73, at 1253.
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termination procedures be provided. Due process requires an adequate
hearing before termination of welfare benefits 0 Such a hearing should
afford the right to be heard in person.
A personal hearing is necessary; if the recipient wishes it, both to explain
to him the nature of the charges against him and to inform him of the evi-
dence on which they are based....
The stakes are simply too high for the welfare recipient ... to allow
termination of aid without giving the recipient a chance, if he so desires,
to be fully informed of the case against him so that he may contest its ba-
sis and produce evidence in rebuttal.91
There should be a right to counsel and a right to confront and examine
witnesses. Only by requiring such procedures can the arbitrary and harsh
practices utilized in the adminstration of welfare programs be restrained.
"[Djecisions concerning human rights are too important to be left to pub-
lic welfare workers and public administration officials without the aid of
law. "
92
The trend in recent judicial decisions is certainly toward an increas-
ing recognition of the importance of eliminating inequality and arbitrari-
ness in the enactment and administration of welfare programs. Recent
court rulings, at all levels, have changed the status of welfare recipients
"from objects of charity to citizens asserting rights under the laws of the
land." 3  This trend must be continued in the future if the goals of the
welfare system are ever to be achieved. Only by recognizing that, "When
individuals have insufficient resources to live under conditions of health
and decency, society has obligations to provide support, and the individ-
ual is entitled to that support as of right," 4 will this country approach
fulfillment of its commitment to eliminate poverty while preserving the
self-sufficiency and dignity of the individual.
David D. Buvinger
9oKelly v. Wyman, 37 U.S.LW. 2324 (D. N.Y.) (3 judge court), cert. granted, 394 U.S.
971 (1968).
91Id.
92 Reich, Individual Rights, supra note 73, at 1257.
93 Pye & Cochran, supra note 76, at 566.
94 Reich, Individua Rights, supra note 73, at 1256.
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